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Abstract
Has partisan polarization reached the stage that it now affects Americans’ decisions whether or
not to get vaccinated against a pervasive and deadly virus such as COVID-19? To date, the
evidence has largely been hypothetical—collected before the vaccine was widely available—
superficial, or contradictory. Using two original surveys conducted at two different time periods
after vaccines became available, this study represents one of the first efforts to systematically
analyze the role of party affiliation in predicting vaccine hesitancy. We find that even after
controlling for a host of demographic and attitudinal variables, Republicans are significantly less
likely—and Democrats more likely—to be vaccinated, to be willing to be vaccinated, and to
recommend vaccination to a friend who asks for advice. In addition to these direct effects, we
also uncover evidence that partisanship affects vaccine hesitancy indirectly through its influence
on Americans’ concern over COVID, belief in vaccine conspiracy theories, and trust in
government, science, and the medical profession. These findings support the idea that
policymakers seeking to increase COVID vaccination rates may need to engage in specialized
outreach not only to specific socio-economic communities, but also to specific partisan
communities.

To be presented at the Marxe School of Public and International Affairs Faculty Seminar,
Baruch College, CUNY, October 13, 2021.
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Partisanship and the Politics of COVID Vaccine Hesitancy
Volumes have been written about the current state of partisan polarization in the United
States. Half a century ago, Americans’ party affiliation 1 might have predicted their voting fairly
well, but not necessarily their positions on specific government policies (Campbell et al. 1960).
In recent decades, evidence suggests that party increasingly helps to predict policy preferences
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Partisanship has also become a salient form of social identity,
such that Americans’ emotional feelings towards members of the other party have grown more
hostile (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). It seems clear that partisanship now has a significant
influence on Americans’ political opinions and even their social relations. But is the state of our
nation so polarized that partisanship even affects the decision to get a vaccine that could save
one’s own life? 2 The COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of life-saving vaccines to combat
it present a unique opportunity to test the extent to which partisanship matters in today’s
America. Yet published research has not yet taken full advantage of this set of events to
adequately address this question.
First, although COVID vaccine willingness has been the subject of many studies, to date,
they have been almost exclusively conducted in 2020, when the idea of a vaccine was still

1

Throughout this paper, we use the terms “party identification”, “party affiliation”, and “partisanship”

interchangeably.
2

Previous research demonstrates that health and science issues can become politicized, and even

preventive vaccines can fall into this category (e.g., the HPV vaccine – see Constantine and Jerman
2007). But the extent to which political beliefs may actually influence behavior that threatens one’s own
life and the life of others has yet to be robustly tested.
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hypothetical. 3 This timing carries important consequences for what we know about vaccine
hesitancy. A systematic review of the literature by Lin, Tu, and Beitsch (2021) finds that, in and
of itself, the conditional and varying nature of vaccination survey questions asked before actual
vaccine approval produced notable differences in findings. Since publication of those studies, the
vaccine landscape has changed considerably. For example, a new administration—representing a
different political party than the one in power in 2020—has given its imprimatur to the vaccine;
multiple vaccines have been given emergency authorization by the nation’s Food and Drug
Administration; millions of people have now been vaccinated, and the vaccinations’ preventive
effects on the spread of COVID have been reported extensively in the news. As a result, while
we know what may have caused initial hesitancy to a hypothetical, eventual vaccine, we know
much less about what is still contributing to vaccine hesitancy now, among those for whom
vaccination is a very real possibility, and who have seen the vaccine being used around them. As
of this writing, 64% of American adults are fully vaccinated, leaving over a third who are not,
and falling far short of the goal of 80% nationwide (Carlsen et al. 2021).
Second, although some of these early studies do include some measure of partisanship as
a control variable, most commonly they have been written for epidemiological journals and thus
it has not been their focus to probe the meaning or robustness of their results regarding political
variables. This has led to some unexplained conflicting findings, with partisan variables
sometimes significant (e.g., Kreps et al. 2020), and other times not (e.g., Kreps et al. 2021).
Similarly, some news media polling may show a correlation between party and vaccination (e.g.,
Caputo 2021), but what happens once controls are included for other, previously hypothesized
3

For relatively comprehensive summaries of these studies and their results see Troiano and Nardi (2021),

and Lin, Tru, and Beitsch (2021).
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predictors that may either diminish or enhance the apparent impact of party? More systematic
analysis is clearly warranted.
Third, the discipline of political science holds that party identification is a core belief that
not only has direct effects on Americans’ attitudes and behaviors, but also indirect effects (e.g.,
Markus and Converse 1979). Yet no existing studies of which we are aware have considered that
partisanship’s effects might go beyond the direct effects on hypothetical vaccine willingness that
some early studies show. As a result, it is possible that partisanship plays an even larger role in
vaccine attitudes and behaviors than current studies would have us believe.
In this study, we attempt to address these gaps in understanding using two original
surveys conducted after COVID vaccination had begun in the United States, at two different
stages of the vaccination effort. The surveys build upon earlier research to provide a wide range
of demographic and attitudinal controls. We also conduct a formal mediation analysis to uncover
any indirect effects of partisanship. The findings enhance our understanding not only of why a
portion of the population remains resistant to COVID vaccination, but also more broadly whether
partisanship in this country has progressed so far as to create potential obstacles to public health.

Existing Research
Over the course of multiple (even a multitude of) studies from 2020 we have come to
know that there are demographic, attitudinal, and even political factors at play in vaccine
hesitancy, at least prior to the vaccines’ actual availability in 2021. Demographically, blacks or
African Americans, people with less education, those with lower incomes, women, the
unemployed, more religious individuals, and younger people have all been shown to have
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potentially lower levels of vaccine willingness than others (Troiano and Nardi 2021; also see
Lin, Tru, and Beitsch 2021).
In terms of attitudes, individual levels of concern about the COVID virus affect
hypothetical willingness to get the vaccine (Callaghan et al. 2021; Pogue et al. 2020). Those who
view the virus as a more serious health threat are more likely to express vaccine willingness.
Additionally, in a social media study from 2020, Benis, Seidmann, and Ashkenazi (2021) find
that significant reasons given for willingness to take the vaccine include fear of the virus,
protecting family and relatives, and civic responsibility. In other words, both egocentric and
prosocial attitudes boost vaccine willingness.
Attitudes towards vaccines in general and the COVID vaccines in particular also affect
hypothetical vaccination willingness. Those who generally reject vaccines or have personal
beliefs against them are less likely to be willing to accept hypothetical COVID-19 vaccination
(Troiano and Nardi 2021, and Lin, Tru, and Beitsch 2021). Beyond general vaccine mistrust,
conspiracy beliefs and misinformation surround the COVID vaccines in particular are
contributing to hesitation. For example, Earnshaw and her colleagues (2020) find that, in April
2020, endorsement of conspiracy theories contributed to both a lower intended likelihood of
getting a vaccine as well as decreased support for COVID-19 public health policy. They did not
find, however, a contribution from conspiracy theories to individual’s self-reported compliance
with public health recommendations. (For a nice summary of COVID conspiracy studies and
their findings see van Mulukom, et. al., 2020.)
Other forms of trust, beyond trusting the vaccine (conspiracy theories and misinformation
contributing to such a distrust), may also be at work in vaccine willingness. Specifically, the
extent to which one trusts authority figures also likely plays a role. Both a general lack of trust
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and a lack of trust in science and scientific sources in particular also contribute to decreased
willingness to take a hypothetical vaccine (Troiano and Nardi 2021). Trust in government has
also been shown to affect vaccine willingness, at least in terms of the standard, yearly influenza
vaccine (Jamison, Quinn, Freimuth 2019). Specific, albeit limited, research into government trust
and willingness to get the COVID vaccine demonstrates that, at least in 2020 when Trump was
President, higher levels of government trust led to lower willingness to get vaccinated (Trent et
al. 2021). The authors conclude this is a unique feature of how politicized the COVID-19
response was in the United States (compared to Australia and the UK, which they also analyzed),
a point we will discuss further below.
Political science literature makes clear that partisan attitudes can underlie and influence
attitudes, behaviors, and decision-making (Campbell, et al. 1960). As a result, it is reasonable to
suspect that partisan attitudes might independently predict vaccination preferences and even
behaviors during this pandemic. In fact, there is solid evidence that prior to vaccine rollout
partisan affiliation affected certain other COVID precautionary attitudes and behaviors. For
example, studies have found that at various time periods in 2020, Democrats were wearing
masks at a significantly higher rate than Republicans, especially as time wore on (Huang, Huang,
and Huang 20201; see also Bruine de Bruin, Saw, and Goldman 2020). Other behaviors that
Democrats were found to be significantly more likely to engage in early in the pandemic include:
washing hands regularly; avoiding high-risk individuals, crowds, and public spaces; and
canceling travel (Bruine de Bruin, Saw, and Goldman 2020, Pickup, Stecula, and van der Linden
2020). Attitudinal effects of party affiliation include both a heightened fear of personal infection,
hospitalization, and death among Democrats (Bruine de Bruin, Saw, and Goldman 2020), and a
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higher general concern about the pandemic by Democrats than Republicans (Ruiz and Bell
2021).
But what does the evidence show regarding vaccine willingness specifically? Despite
frequent mention in the news media about a possible connection between Americans’
partisanship and their willingness to get the COVID vaccine (e.g., Milligan 2021), our review of
the literature found very few rigorous tests of this idea, and (at the time of writing) no published
studies of which we are aware that look at the role of partisanship in the period after the vaccine
was a reality and people could actually get vaccinated.
Lin, Tu, and Beitsch (2021) identify a handful of media polls prior to October 2020 that
show marginal differences between Democrats and Republicans, but they generally do not
control for other factors. A multivariate study by Kreps and her colleagues (2020) that analyzes
surveys conducted in July 2020 finds that Democrats were significantly more willing than
Republicans were to consider the vaccine. However, a follow-up survey conducted by some of
the same authors in October 2020 found no significant effect of party identification after
controlling for vaccine misinformation (Kreps et al. 2021; but see Ruiz and Bell 2021). As a
result, while there is certainly some evidence that willingness to be vaccinated against COVID
might have been a partisan matter during the Trump presidency, before vaccine approval, we do
not know whether party allegiances matter to Americans now that the vaccine has become a
reality.
The limited nature of research on politics and COVID vaccination also means scholars
have not yet investigated the full potential scope of partisanship’s effects. In particular, while
some studies have looked at partisanship’s direct effects—effects independent of other
predictors—we are not aware of any studies of partisanship’s indirect effects—those occurring
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via its influence on other predictors. 4 But the existing literature does provide good reason to
think that a variable such as party affiliation probably would have indirect effects. First, as noted
above, political science scholarship has long held that partisanship is a foundational lens through
which Americans view politics and form their opinions on other current events and issues
(Campbell et al. 1960). Since opinions on current issues and political figures in turn affect
certain behaviors—such vote choice—we know that party identification carries both direct and
indirect effects in American politics (e.g., Markus and Converse 1979).
Second, research into COVID and vaccine attitudes contains some indications that party
might matter indirectly to vaccine hesitancy through its influence on the other hesitancy
predictors. These potential mediators include individuals’ degree of concern over COVID, belief
in conspiracy theories, and various forms of trust. As discussed above, research demonstrates
that party affiliation influences concern over the pandemic and sense of personal risk (e.g.,
Bruine de Bruin, Saw, and Goldman 2020). Since these concerns in turn affect hypothetical
vaccine willingness (e.g., Pogue et. al., 2020), it could be that party indirectly accounts for some
of the impact of personal and prosocial concerns on willingness to get the vaccine.
Similarly, party affiliation might have indirect effects through conspiracy theories and
misinformation. In a panel study involving two surveys – April and July 2020 – Romer and
Jamieson (2020) tested both the potential causes and effects of conspiracy theories. While their
primary focus was on media usage, their results are instructional for our purposes: they find that
not only do conspiracy beliefs negatively influence willingness to take a hypothetical vaccine,
but also that conservatives were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the CDC and
4

For an elaboration on the conceptual and methodological difference between direct and indirect effects,

see Hayes (2017).
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China regarding the pandemic. While those authors focused only on ideology, other research
suggests partisanship might play a similar role. Uscinski and his colleagues (2020) examine the
role both ideology and partisan affiliation play in endorsing COVID conspiracies; they find that
while both alignments (ideological and partisan) matter, the effects of partisanship are stronger
than those of ideology.
Party could also affect vaccination indirectly through various forms of trust that
influence vaccine willingness. The relationship between partisanship and trust in government is
well established, with studies showing that citizens’ political trust increases when their own party
gains power in Washington (Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane 2006; Keele 2005). In addition,
partisanship may also play a role through its influence on other forms of trust during this
pandemic. Multiple COVID studies take at least a passing look at trust, including trust in doctors
and the scientific establishment specifically, as factors that contribute positively to cooperation
with, and support for, COVID protective health behaviors (Troiano and Nardi 2021). In a more
in-depth analysis of the role of trust, however, Plohl and Musil (2021) find that conservatism has
an indirect impact on COVID guideline compliance through trust in science. It is possible, then,
that not only does trust matter to COVID vaccination, but that also that more fundamental
political attitudes, such as party identification, might affect vaccination through trust. Overall,
the literature is suggestive of the potential for a far stronger role for partisan affiliation than
previously hypothesized or tested.

Hypotheses
Given what we know from the literature about the overall power of party identification on
Americans’ attitudes and behaviors, its ability to predict certain COVID-related attitudes and
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behaviors, journalistic reports regarding red-blue differences in marginal vaccination rates, and
preliminary evidence from epidemiological journals, we propose the following hypotheses about
the impact of partisanship on COVID vaccination.
First, we are interested in partisanship’s effects on actual behavior: who is or is not
getting vaccinated?
H1: Among those eligible for vaccination, greater Republican identification (less
Democratic identification) will decrease the likelihood of being vaccinated, all else
being equal.
Second, not all people who are unvaccinated are necessarily unalterably opposed to
vaccination. For example, some may simply not have found the time yet, or may be leaning
towards it, or may be willing to be convinced. Therefore, it is useful to parse their relative
willingness to get vaccinated in the future.
H2: Among the unvaccinated, greater Republican identification (less Democratic
identification) will predict lower expressed willingness to get vaccinated, all else
being equal.
Third, we also care about the potential impact that ordinary Americans might have in
convincing others to get vaccinated. Research shows that people who are undecided on
vaccination are more likely to listen to the advice of people they know personally (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2021). In this case, someone who has already had the experience of being vaccinated
could be a potential evangelist for vaccination, and thereby help to increase overall vaccination
rates. Alternatively, a vaccinated person might not necessarily feel comfortable suggesting to
friends that they get vaccinated. It is even possible that a vaccinated person might advise others
against vaccination (e.g., based on an unpleasant experience). Because vaccine advice matters
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and can theoretically vary even across those who are vaccinated, it is useful to analyze what type
of recommendation vaccinated individuals would make to an unvaccinated friend who asked for
their advice. 5
H3: Among the vaccinated, greater Republican identification (less Democratic
identification) will predict less likelihood of recommending the vaccine to a friend,
all else being equal.
By “all else being equal”, we mean that we expect that partisanship will directly affect
these dependent variables after controlling not only for demographics, but also after controlling
for the effects of Americans’ other attitudes related to COVID, science, and vaccines, as
discussed above. But evidence also suggests that partisanship also impacts attitudes on these
COVID-related control variables themselves. In this case, partisanship may also have indirect
effects on the dependent variables mediated through one or more of these other attitudes. For
example, if identifying as Republican helps predict that a person will have less trust in science,
and less trust in science has its own effect on willingness to be vaccinated, then partisanship
could also affect vaccination indirectly via beliefs in science.
H4: In addition to partisanship’s direct effects on the dependent variables, it will also
have indirect effects mediated through other explanatory variables that partisanship
has been shown to affect: COVID concerns, vaccine conspiracies, and trust in
government, science, and the medical profession.

5

For unvaccinated individuals, we expect that the degree to which they might recommend the vaccine to

a friend who asked for advice will largely be explained by their own degree of willingness to get
vaccinated, leaving little room for independent effects of other variables, such as partisanship. Additional
tests support this expectation.
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Data and Method
To test these hypotheses, we employ data from two original surveys. Each survey is a
fresh cross-section. The surveys were conducted March 15-26 and June 4-9, 2021, respectively
—both after COVID vaccination had begun in the United States, but at two different stages of
the vaccination effort.
The surveys were fielded by Qualtrics, using their panel of web survey vendors. While
convenience samples for surveys are not always ideal, when using sample-matching procedures
like those used by Qualtrics (and YouGov) they can provide accurate estimates of relationships
among variables (e.g., Vavreck and Rivers 2008). In addition, research shows that relationships
found in online panel surveys demonstrate external validity when compared to random sample
surveys (Walter et al. 2018). For our surveys, potential respondents were sampled based on their
age, sex, and race to closely match national census figures on these variables. The second survey
differs from the first in that it contains only white, non-Latinx respondents. 6 Demographic
comparisons for each sample and the CPS are reported in Appendix A.
While the June survey was conducted only among white adults nationally, additional
statistical tests (conducted using the March survey) suggest that the central findings of this study
do not differ significantly across racial and ethnic groups. Marginal rates of vaccination and

6

The survey was conducted for purposes other than this article. Additionally, it was screened to match

national measures on party affiliation to ensure enough Republicans in the sample, as convenience
samples such as these frequently overrepresent Democrats. In the course of the survey, too many women
were interviewed relative to men (the early response rate was so overwhelming it overrode the quotas), as
a result, these data are also weighted slightly for sex (rather than excluding any responses).
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associated attitudes may differ in important ways among these groups, a fact which is welldocumented in other literature, but the role of the predictors, including partisanship, is common
to all of them. As a result, we have little reason to believe that relationships found in the second
survey are any less reliable than those found in the first, despite the differences in samples.
Across the two surveys, we measure three different dependent variables—two repeated in
each, one unique to the June survey. Both surveys asked all respondents whether they would be
willing to receive the COVID vaccine, assuming the vaccine was free and available to them.
Respondents could select from five options: definitely not, probably not, probably get, definitely
get, or already received one or more doses of the vaccine. Answers to this question were then
used to create two separate dependent variables: first, a dichotomous variable measuring whether
or not a person had already received at least one vaccine dose (“vaccination”); second, (for those
who did not report having received the vaccine) a four-point, ordinal variable capturing their
degree of “vaccination willingness.” Finally, the June survey asked all respondents what advice
they would give a friend if the friend asked whether they should get vaccinated. Respondents
could select from four options: advise to definitely not get, advise to probably not get, advise to
probably get, advise to definitely get. Responses were used to create a four-point, ordinal
variable (“vaccination advice”). For analysis of the dichotomous dependent variable
(vaccination), we employ binomial logistic regression. For analysis of the ordinal dependent
variables (willingness, advice), we employ ordered logistic regression.
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The central independent variable of interest in this study is party identification. We
measure this using a five-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican
(positive values indicate more Republicanism). 7
All models control for key demographic variables available in each survey. Specifically,
both surveys control for age, education, and gender. The March survey additionally controls for
Black and Latinx group membership, whether a respondent ever got tested for COVID, and
whether a respondent personally knows someone who died from COVID. Because the June
survey sampled only non-Latinx Whites, it does not contain or require controls for race or
ethnicity. It did not ask respondents about COVID testing or deaths.
The analysis also includes various attitudinal measures that might affect COVID vaccine
hesitancy, though many are unique to one survey or the other. The March survey includes
measures of the degree to which respondents worry about themselves getting sick from COVID
(egocentric or personal concern), and other Americans getting sick from COVID (empathetic or
prosocial concern). The June survey asks respondents about their level of agreement or
disagreement with two of the (among many) common myths about the Coronavirus vaccines:
that they are being used to insert microchips into people, and that they can cause infertility. It
also measures respondents’ level of trust in doctors and their level of trust in scientists. Both
surveys include a standard measure of trust in government. 8 To facilitate comparison of effect

7

The March survey asked a five-point Likert scale question, the June survey used a two-part branching

format that combined to create a five-value scale. In both cases, the scale midpoint includes respondents
who answered independent, other, or neither.
8

Other control variables were investigated, but not included in the final model. When tested in the

models, religiosity and income were generally insignificant and did not improve model fit. Ideology was
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sizes across these different predictors, all independent variables are normalized to range between
0 and 1.

Analysis
Hypothesis 1 regards partisanship’s effect on vaccination behavior among those eligible
for the vaccine. We are able to test this hypothesis with two different samples at two different
stages of the vaccine rollout. For the March survey, conducted earlier in the rollout, we restrict
this analysis to the 26.3 percent of the sample who clearly had been eligible for vaccination

highly correlated with partisanship (March: r = .58; June: r = .63) and produced covariancedecomposition proportions exceeding traditional thresholds for collinearity (Dormann et al. 2013) when
added to the model. We based our decision to focus on partisanship rather than ideology on three factors.
First, the literature finds that while partisanship is a stable, core political belief, ideology is less stable and
more likely to itself be influenced by other issue attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960). Second, research
demonstrates that the standard liberal-to-conservative Likert scale survey question is often misunderstood
by respondents and therefore does not accurately capture the theoretical concept of ideology (Ellis and
Stimson 2012). Third, empirical findings on vaccine attitudes suggest that partisanship matters more than
ideology (e.g., Uscinski et al. 2020).
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based their state’s eligible age groups. 9 For the June survey, we include all survey respondents,
since all adults have been eligible in every state since at least April 19. 10
Table 1 presents the results of the logistic regression analyses of respondents’ vaccination
status as explained by all of the relevant predictor variables available in each survey. The first set
of data columns pertain to the March survey. The coefficients for the demographic control
variables are mostly in the expected direction, though only two reach standard levels of statistical
significance after considering respondents’ political and COVID-related attitudes. 11 The older a
person is, the more likely they are to have gotten a shot. And, those who had been tested or
personally knew someone who had died from COVID are more likely to have gotten themselves
vaccinated. Interestingly, neither concern for oneself getting sick nor concern for other
Americans getting sick is significantly related to vaccination—though the latter concern is in the
expected direction and would be significant at the more permissive .10 level. Trust in
government is in the expected direction, but is not statistically significant.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

9

Data on state age-eligibility for March are from Gamble and Masson 2021. By April 19, all adults were

eligible in every state. Many states also made immunocompromised citizens and/or certain types of frontline workers eligible. However, our surveys did not ask questions about these variables, so we take the
conservative route of only analyzing vaccination among those certain to be eligible based on age.
10

Indeed, by April 30 vaccine supply was outpacing demand in the United States (Ratner 2021).

Including a variable measuring of the number of days all adults had been eligible in each state has no
substantive effect on the results.
11

Since the literature provides expectations regarding the direction of all effects, all significance tests are

one-tailed.
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The central interest of this study is on the power of partisanship to affect vaccination
behavior. In this model, party identification is statistically significant and in the expected
direction. The more Republican (less Democratic) a person’s political leanings, the less likely
they are to have gotten vaccinated, all else being equal. One way to assess the substantive power
of party to predict vaccination is to translate the results of the model into specific probabilities. 12
For Americans who were age-eligible for the vaccine and identically average in terms of all other
predictors, the model predicts that a Democrat has a .58 probability of having been vaccinated
(greater than an even chance) whereas a Republican has a .37 probability of having been
vaccinated (substantially less than an even chance).
Another (albeit imperfect) way to assess the relative power of party to predict vaccination
is to compare the size of coefficients in the model. Since all variable scales were normalized to
range from 0 to 1 before entry into the model, each coefficient captures the relative effect on
vaccination of being at the highest value of that variable as opposed to the lowest value. So, in
this survey, we can observe that being a strong Republican as opposed to a strong Democrat is
associated with a difference in the likelihood of vaccination (-.832 coefficient) that is slightly
larger than the difference associated with not knowing as opposed to knowing someone who died
from COVID (.681 coefficient). At the same time, neither of these variables carries the same
predictive power as the difference between being at the bottom of the age range versus the top of
the age range (6.251 coefficient).

12

In logistic regression, the predicted probability for each value of a variable depends on the specific

values of every other independent variable in the model. Here, we hold all other variables constant at their
average value.
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The vaccination model in the June survey provides an even better fit to the data than the
March model. Here, not only are all the variables in the expected direction, most of them are also
statistically significant. Among the demographic variables, being older, having more formal
education, and being male all predict a greater likelihood of vaccination. The June survey did not
measure concern for one’s self or others getting sick from COVID (variables that were not
significant in the March model). However, it did contain other vaccine-related measures. Belief
in the conspiracy theory that the COVID vaccine is used to inject microchips into people and in
misinformation about the vaccine causing infertility are each significantly associated with a
lower likelihood of getting vaccinated. Trust in doctors and other medical professionals is
positively and significantly associated with vaccination. Trust in scientists, while in the expected
direction, does not reach statistical significance. Given that the federal government had been
deeply involved in funding vaccine development, approving vaccines, and distributing them to
the states, it is not surprising that greater trust in the federal government also predicts a greater
likelihood of getting vaccinated.
More interesting is that even after controlling for all demographic differences, the
significant effects of trust in doctors and government, and beliefs about the vaccine itself,
partisanship remains a significant, independent predictor of vaccination. Based on the estimates
in the June survey, for the otherwise average white American, a Democrat has a .53 probability
of being vaccinated, while a Republican has only a .39 probability. Comparing the coefficients of
the normalized variables, partisanship has less independent predictive power than variables such
as trust in doctors and government, beliefs about microchips and infertility from vaccines, and,
especially, age. Nevertheless, its power appears to nearly identical to that of the full educational
attainment scale. More specifically, the predictive difference between being a Democrat versus a
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Republican is comparable to the difference between having a post-graduate degree versus having
never completed high school. Overall, despite the differences between each model in terms of the
sample, timing, and control variables, the findings in Table 1 are reassuringly consistent
regarding the power of partisanship to predict vaccination behavior.
Having established that party predicts vaccination behavior, the analysis now turns
specifically to the unvaccinated 13, and explaining variation in their willingness to eventually get
a shot. The dependent variable has four options ranging from “definitely not get” to “definitely
get.” Table 2 presents the results of the ordered logistic regressions.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The control variables behave relatively consistently and largely as expected across both
surveys. The variables for education, sex, and trust in government are all significant and in the
expected direction in both models. Having removed from the analysis those respondents who had
already gotten vaccinated, age ceases to play a significant role in vaccine willingness in either
survey. In contrast to Table 1’s analysis of vaccination behavior, here, being Black as well as
both egocentric and empathetic concern over COVID are statistically significant in the March
survey. In the June survey, misinformation about infertility is again significant, though beliefs
about microchips are not. Trust in medical professionals is no longer significant, but trust in
scientists is significant in predicting willingness.
Similar to partisanship’s role in the analysis of actual vaccination, here it is also a
significant predictor of the willingness of the unvaccinated to consider getting a shot. Based on

13

Defined as never having received any COVID vaccine shot. In the March survey, 75 percent of

respondents had not received a shot yet (includes both eligible and not-yet eligible; an “eligibility”
variable has no effect in the model). In the June survey, 54 percent had not received a shot.
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these models in Table 2, Figures 1a and 1b present a graphical representation of the predicted
probabilities of vaccine willingness among Democrats as opposed to Republicans in both the
March analysis (all adults) and the June analysis (white adults only). In both cases, Republicans
have a higher probability than Democrats of feeling that they probably or definitely would not
get the vaccine, and Democrats have a much higher probability than Republicans of feeling that
they definitely would get the vaccine. Collapsing the responses into leaning for or against
vaccination, in the March analysis Republicans have a .34 lower probability than Democrats of
leaning towards vaccination, and in the June analysis they have a .27 lower probability.
[FIGURES 1A AND 1B ABOUT HERE]
In relative terms, the power of party affiliation to predict vaccine willingness is not as
large as that of trust in government, based on coefficient size in both models. On the other hand,
the power of party is again at least as large as the power of education. More specifically, being a
strong Republican as opposed to a strong Democrat predicts about the same difference in vaccine
willingness as does having less than a high school education versus holding post-graduate
degree.
The final dependent variable measures what recommendation vaccinated Americans
would (hypothetically) give to a friend asking for advice about whether to get the COVID
vaccine. This question was only asked on the June survey.
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of vaccine advice. All of the control variables
are in the expected direction, though only beliefs about infertility and trust in scientists and in
government reach statistical significance.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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Of particular interest, the results find a significant and substantive role for partisanship.
Over and above all the controls, partisanship still helps to predict how forcefully an individual
would recommend to a friend that they be vaccinated. Figure 2 translates this effect of
partisanship into probabilistic terms. For two Americans who are exactly the same on all other
demographic and attitudinal variables—including both having personally decided to get
vaccinated—it is not too surprising to find relatively small partisan differences in vaccine advice
to a friend. Nevertheless, being a Republican as opposed to a Democrat does predict a .15 lower
probability of advising a friend to “definitely get” the vaccine (.88 vs. .73). Finally, in relative
terms, the explanatory power of partisanship in Table 3 is slightly smaller than that of an
individual’s degree of trust in scientists.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, across two different survey samples at two different time periods and three types
of dependent variables, and in the presence of a wide range of demographic and attitudinal
controls, partisanship demonstrates its own unique power to predict Americans’ vaccine behavior
and preferences.

Partisanship’s effect through other predictors
While it is impressive that partisanship has a clear role to play in an area that might
ordinarily be considered a purely personal health issue, the findings above may actually
understate the full scope of its role in this area. That is because the models presented in the
previous section assume that each of the attitudes included as control variables were formed
independent of a person’s partisanship. Given what we know about the power of political party
in America, that seems like an overly strong assumption.
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In particular, the literature reviewed earlier in this paper indicates that partisanship likely
influences attitudes such as concern over COVID, vaccine conspiracies, trust in government and
trust in scientists and medical professionals. If these variables are themselves influenced by
partisanship, then in Tables 1, 2, and 3 they may be absorbing some of the predictive power that
party affiliation would have otherwise had without these controls. More realistically, the total
predictive power of partisanship on, say, vaccination, should include both its “direct” effect—
represented by the party coefficient itself—plus an “indirect” effect—captured in the portions of
the coefficients for these other attitudinal variables that are attributable to party. 14
To investigate further, we conduct a mediation analysis to determine the potential
significance of any indirect effects of party through these attitudinal predictors. 15 Specifically,
we employ Hayes’s PROCESS macro (version 3.5, model 4), which estimates and provides
bootstrap confidence intervals for indirect effects in multiple mediators within the same model
(Hayes 2017).

14

This line of thinking assumes that a person’s party identification is formed prior to vaccine attitudes and

behaviors and is not itself a product of those attitudes. To the extent this is not true, it would not be fully
accurate to label such relationships as indirect effects of party. The data used in this study are not
temporal in nature, so this assumption cannot be tested directly here. However, the literature
overwhelmingly supports the notion that party identification is formed early in life and is largely stable,
particularly in the short term (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).
15

We focus on significance rather than size both because there is scholarly disagreement on the

appropriate way to discuss the latter (Preacher and Kelley 2011), and because we do not make any
specific claims about the size of indirect effects.
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The results of the mediation analysis for each model are summarized in Table 4
(additional detail provided in Appendix B). While the significance of specific indirect effects
varies from model to model, table 4 provides ample support for the idea that in addition to the
direct effects of partisanship on vaccination attitudes that were already shown, partisanship likely
also has indirect effects through its influence on other predictive attitudes (which are likely to
have formed after one’s party identification).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Among the predictors that are identified most often across the models as significant
mediators of partisan effects is the belief that the COVID vaccine causes infertility (significant
mediation in all three models that included it). Though not determinative, this observation is
consistent with a narrative in which one of the reasons Republicans may be more vaccinehesitant is that they are more likely than Democrats are to come across this misinformation
and/or to believe it, 16 and in turn this mistaken belief leads to vaccine hesitation. To a lesser
extent, a similar dynamic may be at work regarding the belief that the vaccine injects microchips
into people—a variable that displays a significant indirect effect of party in one out of three
models.
Another predictor that displays fairly consistent indirect effects is trust in government
(three of five models). This finding is consistent with a narrative in which one of the reasons
Republicans are more vaccine-hesitant may be that they are more likely than Democrats are to
mistrust the federal government now that Democrats control it (Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane
2006; Keele 2005); and since the federal government is overseeing COVID vaccine funding and
approval, this distrust in government adds to their hesitation to get vaccinated.
16

Similar evidence is reported by Yee (2021).
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Though less consistently across the models, even trust in scientists (two of three models)
and in doctors (one of three models) appear to carry some indirect effect of partisanship. During
the pandemic and the 2020 election, Democratic leaders and candidates made a point of
emphasizing their trust in science and medical professionals—groups that were actively
promoting vaccination as an eventual solution to COVID. Perhaps as a result, in the general
public, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to report trusting these groups. In the June
survey, among whites, 46% of strong Democrats report trusting scientists compared to only 11%
of strong Republicans (γ = -.36; p<.001), and the partisan difference in trusting doctors and
medical professionals is 16 points (γ = -.14; p<.001). 17 In turn, this trust leads them to be more
supportive than Republicans are of vaccination.

Discussion
As the United States continues to fall short of its COVID vaccination goals,
understanding the impediments to those goals is of utmost importance. While existing research
has taken us some way in understanding vaccine hesitancy, its dated quality in this everchanging pandemic calls for more investigation. Additionally, while talking heads, polls, and
aggregate evidence point to partisan divides in vaccine willingness, we still do not understand
the full potential of our nation’s partisanship to affect potentially life-saving choices.
This article is an attempt to begin to uncover the full extent of the effect that party
affiliation is having on vaccine willingness. We have found that party affiliation has both direct
and indirect—through COVID concern, misinformation and conspiracy thinking, and trust of the
government and the medical and scientific communities—effects on actual self-reported
17

Also see Funk, Kennedy, and Johnson 2020.
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vaccination, vaccination willingness, and willingness to advise friends to get the vaccine. In all
cases, Democrats are significantly more willing and likely to get vaccinated than are Republicans
and those unaffiliated with a party.
This reality holds serious implications for the country’s ability to boost vaccination rates.
While the government is trying to boost vaccination rates in communities of color and those of
low incomes, 18 where rates have been low, relatively little partisan outreach has been made.
President Biden has made some effort to overcome the partisan messaging surrounding vaccines
by arguing they are not a partisan issue, 19 but it is unclear whether federal or state
administrations understand the full depth and breadth of the partisan aspect of hesitancy. As our
study demonstrates, party is tied up with multiple other factors that also need addressing,
including vaccine misinformation and lack of trust. More prominent outreach from leading
Republican figures may be necessary to help make up the partisan deficit. In fact, in a study
using the prisoner’s dilemma game, Powdthavee and colleagues (2021) find that individuals are
more likely to cooperate when the person they were playing against was of the same party
affiliation. Combining this insight with our study’s findings, perhaps in-group attitudes could be
activated to encourage Republicans to accept the vaccine. 20
The results also build upon an extensive literature on partisanship and polarization in
American politics. Although it is widely agreed that elites have polarized along party lines, some
controversy remains regarding the degree of polarization in the general public. Rather than
looking merely at hypothetical preferences on abstract public policy questions, we have

18

For example, see New York State Governor’s Press Office 2021.

19

Pager, Sun, and Wagner 2021.

20

Though we also recognize there may be limits to this approach (e.g., Smith 2021).
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examined actual behavior on a real-world, high stakes question: the decision of whether or not to
vaccinate against a deadly and contagious virus that is present in every community in the
country. The fact that the predictive power of partisanship is found to be robust in the presence
of multiple demographic and attitudinal controls adds another piece of evidence in support of the
idea that the partisan divide in the general public is very real and meaningful.
This study is certainly far from definitive, and it has its own drawbacks. First, we cannot
claim that any of the models provides a comprehensive picture of all possible predictors of
vaccination willingness. Rather, the models are designed primarily to test the effects of the
political aspect that existing literature indicates might matter most: party affiliation. We have
attempted to control for other potential effects that previous studies have demonstrated are
important, including demographic factors, but the controls are not fully consistent across both
surveys, and there may still be other factors for which we did not control. Another drawback to
our study is that our second survey includes only white respondents. While we still believe it
contains valuable information, and the evidence is strikingly consistent with that from our first
survey, an ideal analysis vaccine willingness would include all races and ethnicities.
Despite any flaws, we hope that by conducting an in-depth, scholarly study we can draw
attention to the seriousness of the party divide on vaccine willingness. In political science we
have become somewhat used to the America’s polarization, but in this situation that polarization
may be resulting in a risk to people’s health and lives.
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Tables
Table 1: Effect of partisanship on vaccination (among eligible) c

Demographics
Age
Education
Male
Black
Latinx
Got a COVID test
Know a COVID fatality
COVID/vaccine attitudes
Egocentric COVID concern
Empathetic COVID concern
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Political attitudes
Trust government
Party identification
Pseudo R-squared
Number of cases

March Survey
coeff. p-value
6.859
.839
-.284
-.633
-.353
.711
.681

.000***
.067
.188
.098
.213
.019*
.018*

-.655
1.214

.180
.076

.383
-.832

24.7%
212

.297
.043*

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
c
See text for detailed description of eligible
^Non-Latinx whites only

June Survey^
coeff. p-value
3.014
.575
.482

.000***
.044*
.008**

-1.256
-2.458
1.263
.574

.001***
.000***
.007**
.115

.807
-.573

.033*
.014*

48.9%
741
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Table 2: Effect of partisanship on vaccination willingness (among unvaccinated)
March Survey
coeff. p-value

Demographics
Age
Education
Male
Black
Latinx
Got a COVID test
Know a COVID fatality
COVID/vaccine attitudes
Egocentric COVID concern
Empathetic COVID concern
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Political attitudes
Trust government
Party identification

1.947
-1.262

Pseudo R-squared
Number of cases

32.0%
600

.238
.946
.369
-.859
-.230
.169
.010

.252
.000***
.012*
.000***
.141
.156
.477

1.241
1.074

.000***
.001**

.000***
.000***

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
^Non-Latinx whites only

June Survey^
coeff. p-value
-.238
1.043
.541

.304
.001**
.004**

-.035
-1.213
.335
1.654

.462
.004**
.252
.001***

2.753
-1.431

.000***
.000***

41.6%
393
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Table 3: Effect of partisanship on recommending vaccination (among vaccinated)

Demographics
Age
Education
Male
COVID/vaccine attitudes
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Political attitudes
Trust government
Party identification
Pseudo R-squared
Number of cases

June Survey^
coeff. p-value
.910
.602
.200

.057
.115
.246

-.947
-2.055
.678
1.284

.058
.000***
.191
.023*

2.157
-1.015

.001**
.005**

25.7%
348

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
^Non-Latinx whites only
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Table 4: Indirect effects of party on vaccination attitudes

Mediator of party
Egocentric COVID concern
Empathetic COVID concern
Trust government
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility

Vaccinated
(March)
n
n
n

Outcome variable
Willingness Vaccinated Willingness
(March)
(June)
(June)
YES
YES
YES
n
YES
YES
n
n
YES
YES
n
YES
YES

Advice
(June)
YES
n
YES
n
YES

Note: Table is a summary of mediation analysis results presented in Appendix A. Statistically significant indirect
effects are indicated by “YES”; insignificant effects by “n”; blank cells are variables not included in the respective
model. Indirect effects are in addition to direct effects found in tables 1-3.
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Figures

Figure 1a: Estimated probabilites of vaccine
willingness, by party (March)
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Figure 1b: Estimated probabilites of vaccine
willingness, by party (June)
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Figure 2: Estimated probabilities of vaccine
advice to a friend (June)
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Appendix A
Table A1: Comparison of Qualtrics Data to Current Population Survey Benchmarks

Age (mean)
Male
College Degree
Black/Non-Hispanic
White/Non-Hispanic
Hispanic

March survey
comparison
Qualtrics CPS 2018
47
46
48%
48%
43%
31%
13%
12%
62%
63%
18%
17%

June survey
comparison*
Qualtrics
CPS 2018
48
47
49%
49%
36%
35%

*June survey is among non-Hispanic Whites only; comparative CPS figures reflect this same filter.
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Appendix B
Mediation Analysis
This appendix presents the indirect effect output 21 from multiple mediation analysis of
each of the five “direct effect” regression models presented in the text (tables 1-3). We employ
Hayes’s PROCESS macro (version 3.5, model 4), which estimates and provides bootstrap
confidence intervals for indirect effects in multiple mediators within the same model (Hayes
2017). For each analysis, we used 5000 bootstrap samples. Because we have clear directional
expectations for each indirect effect, we specified 90% confidence intervals to provide a onetailed test of the null hypothesis (no indirect effect) at p<.05.
Table B1: Indirect effects of party on vaccination (March)
Mediator
Trust government
Egocentric COVID concern
Empathetic COVID concern
(Total indirect effect)

B (boot)
-0.0936
0.1679
-0.2678
-0.1934

SE (boot)
0.2028
0.2142
0.2295
0.2490

LLCI (boot)
-0.4344
-0.1532
-0.7039
-0.6422

ULCI (boot)
0.2252
0.5487
0.0421
0.1848

Table B2: Indirect effects of party on vaccination willingness (March)
Mediator
Trust government
Egocentric COVID concern
Empathetic COVID concern
(Total indirect effect)

B (boot)
-0.1589
-0.1102
-0.1010
-0.3701

SE (boot)
0.0398
0.0407
0.0427
0.0622

LLCI (boot)
-0.2270
-0.1835
-0.1735
-0.4733

ULCI (boot)
-0.0969
-0.0491
-0.0359
-0.2683

LLCI (boot)
-0.2296
-0.1548
-0.3207
-0.1967
-0.4733
-1.0188

ULCI (boot)
0.0019
-0.0170
0.0377
-0.0294
-0.1739
-0.4669

Table B3: Indirect effects of party on vaccination (June)
Mediator
Trust government
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
(Total indirect effect)

B (boot)
-0.1042
-0.0790
-0.1301
-0.1006
-0.3083
-0.7223

SE (boot)
0.0699
0.0425
0.1097
0.0521
0.0908
0.1693

In each case where the indirect effect of X on Y through M is significant, the effect of X on M was also
significant.

21
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Table B4: Indirect effects of party on vaccination willingness (June)
Mediator
Trust government
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
(Total indirect effect)

B (boot)
-0.1915
-0.0102
-0.1375
-0.0025
-0.0352
-0.3768

SE (boot)
0.0512
0.0164
0.0476
0.0118
0.0261
0.0712

LLCI (boot)
-0.2806
-0.0397
-0.2182
-0.0234
-0.0843
-0.4923

ULCI (boot)
-0.1114
0.0137
-0.0654
0.0153
-0.0012
-0.2618

Table B5: Indirect effects of party on vaccination advice (June)
Mediator
Trust government
Trust medical professionals
Trust scientists
Vaccine injects microchips
Vaccine causes infertility
(Total indirect effect)

B (boot)
-0.0431
-0.0063
-0.0433
-0.0028
-0.0221
-0.1176

SE (boot)
0.0179
0.0087
0.0271
0.0096
0.0163
0.036

LLCI (boot)
-0.0742
-0.0239
-0.0905
-0.0194
-0.0528
-0.1805

ULCI (boot)
-0.0156
0.0025
-0.0022
0.0121
-0.0011
-0.0625
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